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ABSTRACT Mobile small cell technology is considered as a 5G enabling technology for delivering
ubiquitous 5G services in a cost-effective and energy efficient manner. Moreover, Network Coding (NC)
technology can be foreseen as a promising solution for the wireless network of mobile small cells to increase
its throughput and improve its performance. However, NC-enabled mobile small cells are vulnerable to
pollution attacks due to the inherent vulnerabilities of NC. Although there are several works on pollution
attack detection, the attackers may continue to pollute packets in the next transmission of coded packets of
the same generation from the source node to the destination nodes. Therefore, in this paper, we present an
intrusion detection and location-aware prevention (IDLP)mechanismwhich does not only detect the polluted
packets and drop them but also identify the attacker’s exact location so as to block them and prevent packet
pollution in the next transmissions. In the proposed IDLP mechanism, the detection and locating schemes
are based on a null space-based homomorphic MAC scheme. However, the proposed IDLP mechanism is
efficient because, in its initial phase (i.e., Phase 1), it is not needed to be applied to all mobile devices in order
to protect the NC-enabled mobile small cells from the depletion of their resources. The proposed efficient
IDLP mechanism has been implemented in Kodo, and its performance has been evaluated and compared
with our previous IDPS scheme proposed in [1], in terms of computational complexity, communicational
overhead, and successfully decoding probability as well.
INDEX TERMS Network coding, pollution attacks, intrusion detection, location-aware prevention, effi-
ciency, 5G.
I. INTRODUCTION
Fifth generation of mobile networks is being deployed and
expected to meet the high quality of service provision,
the high data rate, and low end to end latency communi-
cations. The concept of small cells enables 5G to improve
its quality of experience to remote areas by extending the
coverage in a cost effective manner [2]–[6]. Device to device
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Marco Martalo .
communication further improves the energy efficiency and
ensures effective deployment of ubiquitous services that the
5G envisions [7], [8]. However, studies are still going on
how to harness the available bandwidth efficiently and tackle
the challenges due to packet loss during transmission. Net-
work Coding (NC) appears to be an effective solution to
address these challenges [9], [10]. SECRET [11] proposes
a NC-enabled mobile small cell environment (see Fig. 2)
where network coding is applied to address the challenges
of next generation wireless networks. NC [12] improves the
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efficiency of the network by coding the packets and allowing
the intermediate nodes to recode the packets instead of simply
’store and forward’.More specifically, random linear network
coding [13] proves to be an efficient solution for the wireless
environment. Deploying NC techniques also improve the
energy efficiency of the network since it reduces the number
of transmissions required for communications. Furthermore,
NC also provides some inbuilt resistance to wiretapping and
eavesdropping [14], [15]. However, network coding suffers
from attacks [15], especially pollution attacks.
The NC-enabled environment suffers from pollution
attacks where malicious intermediate nodes manipulate
packets in transition. These modified packets (i.e., polluted
packets) will result in erroneous decoding at the receivers.
Furthermore, if the polluted packets are allowed to pass
through genuine nodes, they can pollute more packets on the
fly. Thus, identifying the polluted packets as well as the exact
location of malicious users are equally important tasks. Even
though there are many integrity schemes against pollution
attacks [14], [16]–[24], only a few focusing on identifying
the location of malicious users [24]–[27].
In this work, an efficient intrusion detection, and location-
aware prevention (IDLP) mechanism is proposed to detect
pollution attacks and locates the attacker’s exact location
and prevent pollution attacks in NC-enabled mobile small
cells. The proposed IDLP mechanism is an extension of our
proposed location-aware IDPS scheme for network coding-
enabled mobile small cells presented in [27]. We use the
null space-based homomorphic MAC scheme [14] for both
the detection and locating schemes, which is adapted to the
mobile small cell environment. The detection scheme gives
us this opportunity to detect pollution attacks efficiently at the
earliest possible node and drop the detected polluted packets.
However, this course of action is generally not sufficient
since the attackers can continue to pollute packets in the
next transmission of coded packets of the same generation
from the source node to the destination nodes, which leads
to a waste of the network’s throughput. Therefore, in this
work, we focus on the identification of the exact attackers’
location and blocking them to protect the network from future
pollution attacks. The proposed IDLP mechanism consists
of two phases to prevent the network from the depletion of
their resources. In the first phase, the proposed mechanism
applies to Relay Nodes (RNs) and Destination Nodes (DNs),
and it is not needed to be applied to all nodes when there
is no attack in the network. Therefore, in this mechanism,
we do not take time for verification in all the intermediate
nodes when there is no attack. The mechanism is described
in section IV precisely. Moreover, the proposed IDLP mech-
anism is Implemented on Kodo and is compared with the
proposed IDPS scheme in [1].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the scenario architecture. In Section III, we pro-
vide the background and related work of NC technology,
secure NC, and security schemes against pollution attacks in
NC-enabled networks. In Section IV, the detailed description
of the proposed efficient intrusion detection and location-
aware prevention (IDLP) mechanism for network coding-
enabledmobile small cells are given. In Section V, we provide
details of the implementation of the proposed scheme in
Kodo. In Section VI, we provide the performance evaluation
of the proposed mechanism and compare it with our previous
IDPS scheme. Finally, Section VII concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Defending against pollution attacks in NC-enabled networks
mainly depends on ensuring the integrity of the packets in
transition. However, basic integrity schemes do not work with
network coding due to the recoding of packets at intermediate
nodes. Schemes with homomorphic property become essen-
tial to ensure the integrity of packets in NC-enabled networks.
In this section, we discuss:
1) Pollution attacks
2) Secure network coding
3) Locating schemes
4) IDPS schemes
A. POLLUTION ATTACKS
Pollution attacks or byzantine modification attacks are the
most severe attacks in a network coding-enabled environ-
ment. An adversary tries to inject polluted packets to the
network in order to deplete network resources (e.g., CPU
power, memory, and battery level). If any nodes use the pol-
luted packets to combine with other packets and create coded
packets, this pollution will publish in the whole network.
Thus, the receivers would not be able to decode the native
packets. Pollution attacks can be divided into two types, data
pollution attacks, and tag pollution attacks. In data pollution
attacks, the adversary tries to pollute (e.g., modify) the data
packets being transferred. However, in tag pollution attacks,
the adversary pollutes the tags attached to the packets to
prevent the destination nodes from decoding correctly, which
results in reduced efficiency of the network [15], [28], [29].
Furthermore, both types of pollution attacks can be
launched by either an external adversary or an internal com-
promised node (i.e., byzantine modification attacks). The
external adversary tries to inject corrupted packets into the
network in order to corrupt other coded packets. However,
an internal compromised node aims to pollute the transmitted
packets by modifying them and thus compromising their
integrity [15], [28], [29].
B. SECURE NETWORK CODING
There are plenty of different detection schemes against pollu-
tion attacks in network coding, such as information-theoretic
schemes, cryptographic schemes, homomorphic signature
schemes, and homomorphic MAC-based schemes. We focus
on the homomorphic MAC-based schemes whose scope
is to ensure integrity in network coded packets, as initi-
ated by Agrawal et al. [16]. However, the schemes based
on homomorphic MACs are vulnerable to tag pollution
attacks. In [30], Zhang et al. studied the use of orthogonality
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FIGURE 1. An example of identifying an attacker’s location by the
Hotspots, using information about polluted packets through the edges.
The attacker is node C. Scenario 1, shows sets of edges when the attacker
lies about its incoming packets. However, scenario 2, shows sets of edges
when the attacker cannot lie.
property generating tags. Further, they addressed the issue
of tag pollution attack by combining a homomorphic sig-
nature to the MAC scheme and thus proposing MacSig.
Esfahani et al. improved the efficiency of these schemes
through a series of works [14], [31], [32]. The works in [32]
and [14] are focused on different key sharing approaches and
dual MAC schemes for efficient integrity schemes. The work
in [14] is focused on a null space-based scheme where the
tags are mixed to the original packets based on a randomly
generated swapping vector. This also reduces the probability
of a successful tag pollution attack without extra overheads.
In another set of work, Adat et al. [33], [34] address the
pollution attacks using different approaches of tag sharing.
Authors proposed a detection scheme based on homomor-
phic mac, and also they have used a central controller and
blockchain for preventing the network form tag pollution
attack.
C. LOCATING SCHEMES
Identifying the location of a malicious user is equally impor-
tant as detecting a security attack so that other participating
nodes can be informed about the presence of an adversary.
Depending only on a single node’s detection report and
declare any other node as an adversary is not completely
acceptable since, in such cases, a malicious node can deceive
the network by accusing the previous node of being an adver-
sary. As shown in Fig. 1, node C is an adversary. In scenario
1, we consider that the attacker deceives about its incoming
packet. However, in scenario 2, the attacker does not deceive.
In this scenario, a malicious node deceives the network and
reports a genuine parent node as an adversary, which can lead
to an unstable network situation. Thus, additional location
schemes or verification of adversaries become essential to
maintain a fair network environment. Siavoshni et al. pro-
posed an integrity scheme that also locates the adversary
using a central controller [25]. In this scheme, the interme-
diate node reports a pollution attack along with the polluted
packets to a central controller, and this trusted controller
verifies the pollution. The central controller verifies the
packet with the subspace of source packets. If it detects
a pollution attack, the parent node, which generated the
polluted packet, will be considered as a malicious node.
Another integrity scheme discussing locating the adversary is
SpaceMac [24]. SpaceMac considers a cooperative environ-
ment between parent and child nodes. It enforces the child
nodes to create packets only from the signed subspace pro-
vided by the parent nodes. The central controller, who knows
the complete topology of the graph, verifies whether the
packets generated by the child node belongs to the subspace
of its parent nodes and locates the adversaries efficiently,
if any. However, these schemes have significant overhead and
dependency on a central trusted controller.
Finally, Parsamehr et al. [27] proposed a location-aware
IDPS which does not only detect and drop pollution attacks
but also identify the attacker’s exact location. The proposed
IDPS consists of detection and locating schemes based on
null space homomorphic MAC. The detection scheme con-
siders some tags added by the source node to each coded
packet to detect pollution attacks by intermediate nodes and
destination nodes. In the locating scheme, each intermediate
node adds an extra tag to the coded packets to verify itself to
the Hotspot, which plays the role of the central controller for
each mobile small cell. In addition, when each node detects
any pollution, the node reports the pollution to the Hotspot
that is responsible for detecting the exact location of the
attacker(s) based on received reports.
D. IDPS SCHEMES
Intrusion detection and prevention schemes (IDPSs) are
mainly focused on identifying potential security incidents
and blocking or preventing malicious activity. Regarding
adversaries detection, IDPSs use signature-based detection
to identify known adversaries in the networks that are not
related to legitimate users [35]–[38]. In our previous IDPS
scheme [1], we proposed for the first time, to the best of
our knowledge, a novel intrusion detection, and prevention
scheme (IDPS) for network coding-enabled mobile small
cells. The proposed scheme is based on homomorphic MAC-
based scheme to identify known malicious behavior (pollu-
tion attacks). It is based on a null space-based homomorphic
message authentication code scheme that allows the detection
of pollution attacks and takes proper risk mitigation actions
when an intrusive incident is detected. The proposed scheme
has been implemented in Kodo, and its performance has been
evaluated in terms of computational and communicational
overhead. Its performance evaluation has shown that it does
not add significant computational and communicational over-
head.
III. SCENARIO ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we provide the scenario architecture of the
EU funded H2020-MSCA project ‘‘SECRET’’ (See Fig. 2),
which is focused on secure network coding-enabled mobile
small cells [11]. Harnessing ongoing trends on 5G technology
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FIGURE 2. Scenario Architecture.
standardization and mobile small cells, a beyond 5G scenario
architecture was proposed as shown in Fig. 2. This scenario
architecture consists of a Macro Cell, including a number
of Mobile Small Cells (MSCs) (i.e., a cluster of mobile
devices) that are controlled by a cluster-head (i.e., Hotspot).
The Hotspot is a mobile device (i.e., mobile node) within the
identified cluster of mobile devices that are nominated to play
the role of the local radio manager to control and maintain
the cluster. Moreover, the Hotspots of different clusters coop-
erate to form a wireless network of MSCs that have several
gateways/entry points to the mobile network using intelligent
high-speed connections. It is worthwhile to mention that a
centralized software-defined controller controls the Hotspots
of the different clusters. Finally, the data communication
between the mobile nodes is established through Device-to-
Device (D2D) communications and optimized by network
coding technology. In this scenario, it is assumed, as shown
in Fig. 2, that a mobile source node (SN) in MSC1 multicasts
packets to two mobile destination nodes (DNs) inMSC6. The
assumption is that SN and DNs are not in the same MSC
and the SN applies Random Linear Network Coding (RLNC)
to code and transmit packets, through the multi-hop D2D
network, to the DNs where they are decoded. In this scenario,
it is assumed that the D2D network consists of legitimate
mobile nodes and relay mobile nodes (RNs) that are User
Equipments (UEs) and connect the MSCs to each other.
IV. PROPOSED EFFICIENT INTRUSION DETECTION AND
LOCATION-AWARE PREVENTION (IDLP) MECHANISM
FOR NC-ENABLED MSCS
In this section, we present the proposed intrusion detection
and location-aware prevention (IDLP) mechanism consisting
of a) a detection scheme that is used to detect pollution
attacks; and b) a locating schemewhich is a part of the preven-
tion mechanism and supported by the detection scheme that
allows the identification of the exact location of the adversary
nodes (i.e., the source of pollution attacks). The detection and
the locating schemes of the proposed IDLP mechanism are
based on the Null Space homomorphic MAC scheme [14].
Due to a large number of mobile devices, the execution
of the proposed IDLP mechanism on all nodes in each MSC
will lead to the waste of a huge amount of devices’ resources
(e.g., CPU power, memory, and battery level) per verification
time. Thus, we consider the application of the proposed IDLP
into two phases in order to improve its efficiency in terms of
resources consumption (see Fig. 4);
• Phase 1: Identification of the MSC where pollution
attack occurred. Initially, the detection scheme of the
proposed IDLP mechanism is applied to all RNs and
DNs, which are the final receivers of the packets.
We consider that each RN connects two MSCs, and all
transferred data between the twoMSCs pass through this
RN, as shown in Fig. 3. Therefore, RNs are located in
the best position to detect attacks and protect the whole
network from pollution. However, in the case that the
SN and DNs are in the same MSC, then the DNs are
responsible for attack detection. When an RN detects a
pollution attack, it drops the polluted packet and reports
the attack to the Hotspots of the MSCs in which it
belongs to. On the other hand, when a DN detects a
pollution attack, it drops the polluted packet and reports
the attack to the Hotspot of the MSC where it belongs
to. Then, each Hotspot forwards the received report to
the SDN Controller, which is responsible for identifying
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FIGURE 3. Three butterfly topologies.
the MSC where a pollution attack occurred based on the
received reports.
• Phase 2: Identification of the adversary node’s location
within the polluted MSC. The detection scheme and the
locating scheme are applied to all mobile devices of the
polluted MSC, which was identified in Phase 1. When a
mobile device, within the polluted MSC, detects a pol-
luted packet and drops it, then the mobile device creates
a new report, based on the locating scheme, which is
sent to the Hotspot of the identified MSC. In addition,
according to the locating scheme, each mobile device,
within the polluted MSC, creates an expanded coded
packet that is sent to the next node and the Hotspot as
well. Afterward, the Hotspot forwards: a) the received
report from the device that detected the polluted packet,
and b) the expanded coded packet to the SDN controller
that is responsible for identifying the exact location of
the adversary mobile device(s). In particular, the SDN
controller makes use of the information included in the
received report and expanded packet in order to identify
the adversary’s location. As a next step, after the identi-
fication of the adversary’s location, the SDN controller
will decide about the most appropriate preventive action
(e.g., block adversary mobile device(s) from accessing
the network) that should be taken to protect the network
from the adversary.
A. DETECTION SCHEME
The detection scheme of the proposed IDLP mechanism is
based on the null space-based homomorphic MAC scheme
that was presented in our previous works [1] and [14] and
makes use of orthogonality to verify the tags appended to
the end of each packet. According to [1], the SN divides
the message into a generation of native packets denoted as
b1, b2, . . . , bm, where m is generation size and each packet
bi consists of n symbols (i.e., bi,1, bi,2, . . . , bi,n) in the finite
field Fnp. Therefore, the source node will generate a coded
packet bi according to (1) and send it to the next intermediate
nodes.
bi = (
m︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, · · · , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
i−1
, 1, 0, · · · , 0, bi,1, · · · , bi,n) ∈ Fm+np (1)
For simplicity, (1) can also be written as follows:
bi = (bi,1, · · · , bi,m+n) ∈ Fm+np (2)
After that each, intermediate node combines h received
coded packets (b1,b2, . . . ,bh) and creates a new coded
packet x and sends it to its neighbors. As shown in (3), the new
coded packet is a linear combination of all the received coded
packet belonging to the same generation, whereβ is randomly
selected from Fp and all arithmetic operation are done over
the finite field Fp.
x =
h∑
i=1
βibi (3)
As wementioned in previous work [1], when an SN creates
the coded packet, it generates L tags, based on null space
properties [30], that are used to detect pollution attacks. There
are five steps to create the tags and also verify the orthogo-
nality of the received coded packets with the tags appended
to them:
1) Key distribution to the source node: A key distribution
center creates a set of keys (C1, C2, . . . , CL) in the finite
field Fm+n+Lp and distributes them to the source node.
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FIGURE 4. Proposed Efficient Intrusion Detection and Location-aware Prevention (IDLP) Mechanism for NC-enabled MSCs.
FIGURE 5. L tags appended to the end of coded packet bi .
2) The source node creates L tags (i.e., t1, t2, . . . , tL) by
using L keys, distributed by KDC in the previous step,
for each coded packet according to (4). Each coded
packet contains m + n symbols, and the L generated
tags (i.e., tSN ) are appended to the end of each coded
packet, as shown in Fig. 5.C1,1 . . . C1,m+n... ... ...
CL,1 . . . CL,m+n

L∗(m+n)
∗

bi,1
bi,2
:
bi,m+n

(m+n)∗1
+
C1,m+n+1 . . . C1,m+n+L: : :
CL,m+n+1 . . . CL,m+n+L

L∗L
∗

t1
t2
...
tL

L∗1
= 0
(4)
3) The L tags are swapped based on the shared secret
key (SV ) between the SN and DNs, according to (5),
to avoid tag pollution attacks.
bi = Swap(bi)SV (5)
4) The KDC creates new keys based on the set of keys
that were distributed to the SN in step 1 by using the
swapping vector SV and they are generated by the KDC
according to (6). Then, these keys are distributed to
the intermediate nodes and DNs to verify the received
coded packets.
C′i = Swap(Ci)SV (6)
5) Finally, each intermediate node and DN verifies the
received coded packet based on the following equation:
δ = Swap(Ci)SV ∗ Swap(bi)SV =
m+n+L∑
j=1
C′i,j ∗ bi,j
(7)
If δ = 0, then the received coded packet is verified and
acceptable to transmit to the next nodes. Otherwise, it is
dropped.
B. LOCATING SCHEME
The locating scheme is carried out in Phase 2 of the proposed
IDLP mechanism in order to identify the exact location of the
adversary mobile node within the pollutedMSC. Particularly,
the locating scheme is applied to all mobile devices of the
polluted MSC that was identified in Phase 1. According to
the locating scheme, each mobile node is responsible to:
a) generate an expanded coded packet, based on the received
coded packet, and transmit it to the next node and the Hotspot
as well, and b) send a report to the Hotspot when a pol-
luted packet is detected through the detection scheme. Both
the expanded coded packet and the report are forwarded to the
SDN Controller which leverages them in order to identify the
exact location of the adversary.
1) EXPANDED CODED PACKET
The most critical problem for detecting the exact location of
an adversary mobile node is derived from the fact that nodes
may deceive Hotspots (see Fig. 1). For example, a node can
report that the received packet from the previous legal node is
polluted [24]. Therefore, an extra tag is added to each coded
packet for verifying each intermediate node to the SDN Con-
troller. This tag is created based on the pre-distributed share
key between each node and the SDN Controller. To calculate
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FIGURE 6. Expanded Coded Packet {bi ||tSN ||si }.
FIGURE 7. The generated report {e||si−1||si }.
the proper tag, the following Equation is used:[C′′1,1 . . . C′′1,m+n . . . C′′1,m+n+L]1∗(m+n+L)
∗

bi,1
bi,2
:
bi,m+n
t1
:
tL

(m+n+L)∗1
+ C′′1,m+n+L+1 ∗ si = 0 (8)
where
[C′′1,1 . . . C′′1,m+n . . . C′′1,m+n+L+1]1∗(m+n+L+1) is the
pre-shared key distributed by the KDC, and si is the properly
calculated tag.
As we can see in Fig. 6, each intermediate node attaches a
tag si to each coded packet in order to create an expanded
coded packet. Then, each intermediate node sends the
expanded coded packet {bi||tSN ||si} to the next node and
Hotspot. Where bi is the coded packet, tSN represents the set
of appended tags by SN, and si is the appended tag by the
given intermediate node. The Hotspot forwards the expanded
coded packet received from each intermediate node to the
SDN Controller so that the SDN Controller can verify legal
nodes.
The SDN controller verifies the received expanded coded
packet {bi||tSN ||si−1} based on the following formula which
if δ = 0, then the received expanded coded packet is verified.
δ =
m+n+L+1∑
j=1
C′′i,j ∗ {bi,j ‖ tSN ‖ si} (9)
2) REPORT
Every time that an intermediate node or a DN detects any
polluted packet (e) signed by the previousmobile device’s key
({e||si−1}), a report is generated by the given node. As shown
in Fig. 7 the generated report is the received polluted packet
({e||si−1}) signed by the given node and is represented as
{e||si−1||si}. Then, the node sends the report to the Hotspot,
and the Hotspot forwards it to the SDNController. This report
allows the SDN Controller to identify the attacker’s location.
The SDN controller verifies the sender of the received
report {e||si−1||si} based on the following Equation which
if δ = 0, then the sender is verified.
δ =
m+n+L+2∑
j=1
C′′i,j ∗ {e ‖ si−1 ‖ si} (10)
Afterward, the SDN controller verifies the signature of the
adversary node (si−1) based on the following Equation which
if δ = 0, then the signature is verified.
δ =
m+n+L+1∑
j=1
C′′i,j ∗ {e ‖ si−1} (11)
3) SCENARIOS FOR LOCATING SCHEME
Each intermediate node should check the validity of the
received packets {bi||tSN ||si−1} based on the detection
scheme (see Fig. 8). The intermediate node checks the tags
tSN appended to the end of the received packet by the SN.
If there is no pollution attack, the intermediate node deletes
tag si−1, attached by the previous node, and creates the coded
packet by combining received genuine packets and also cre-
ates si, and attaches it to the end of the coded packet. Then,
the intermediate sends {bi||tSN ||si} to the next node and the
Hotspot as well. Otherwise, if the intermediate node detects
any polluted packet, it should drops it and creates a report
{e||si−1||si} and sends it to the Hotspot. Hotspot forwards it
to the SDN controller who is responsible to identify the exact
location of adversary mobile devices.
As we discussed in the pollution attacks section, there are
two different adversaries; external and internal adversaries.
External adversaries attempt to inject some corrupted packets
to make pollution, and internal adversaries are the com-
promised nodes which make pollution by modifying trans-
mitted packets or injecting polluted packets. After applying
our locating scheme, the external adversaries cannot verify
themselves to the Hotspot (see Fig. 9), because they do not
have access to the shared key between the SDN Controller
and each valid node to create a valid signature si. So, when
the SDN Controller receives polluted packets {e||s′i} (i.e., s′i
is an invalid created tag by an external adversary), then it is
able to detect the adversary and decide about the preventive
actions (e.g., block compromised mobile device from access-
ing the network) that should take. However, the most serious
challenge is the internal pollution attacks which are created
by compromised nodes because, as assumed, they have access
to the shared secret key between each intermediate node and
the SDN Controller. We have considered the following two
scenarios to present how the proposed locating scheme can
identify the internal adversary’s location.
• Scenario-1 An internal adversary node, B, between two
normal nodes, A and C: B is an adversary who has four
options to report to Hotspot in order to deceive the SDN
Controller according to the following two cases:
– ‘‘When B receives a normal packet from node A’’:
Node B has two options to launch an attack.
i. To send a polluted packet {e||sB} to the next
node C (pollution attack): If node B sends a
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FIGURE 8. Locating scheme of the Proposed IDLP Mechanism for NC-enabled MSCs.
FIGURE 9. An external pollution attack.
polluted packet {e||sB} to node C , then node C
will drop it and reports a pollution {e||sB||sC}
to the Hotspot and Hotspot forwards the report
to the SDN Controller. When SDN Controller
verifies sC and sB, it detects that node B is an
adversary (see Fig. 10). However, if the polluted
packet {e||s′B}, which is sent to node C , has an
invalid tag s
′
B, it means that node B acted as
an intelligent adversary and generated an invalid
signature for the expanded coded packet. In this
case, the SDN Controller is not sure that node
B is an adversary and thus, the SDN Controller
FIGURE 10. An Internal pollution attack; A is a normal node and B is an
adversary.
should wait to receive more reports against node
B until to decide whether node B is an adver-
sary or not and take a prevention action against
node B.
ii. To drop the received packet from node A: If
node B drops the received packet from node A,
it will achieve another kind of attack (i.e., DoS
attack), which is, however, out of the scope of
this paper.
– ‘‘When B receives a polluted packet from node A
’’: Similar to previous case, node B has two options
to launch an attack:
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FIGURE 11. An Internal pollution attack; both node A and node B are
adversaries.
i. To send a polluted packet {e||sB} to the next
node C: If node B sends a polluted packet
{e||sB} to node C , then node C will drop it and
reports a pollution {e||sB||sC} to the Hotspot and
Hotspot forwards the report to the SDN Con-
troller. When SDN Controller verifies sC and sB,
it detects that node B is an adversary. However,
if the polluted packet {e||s′B}, which is sent to
node C , has an invalid tag s
′
B, it means that node
B acted as an intelligent adversary and gener-
ated an invalid signature for the expanded coded
packet. In this case, the SDN Controller is sure
that node B is an adversary because node B has
already reported the pollution but it did not drop
the polluted packet. Then, the SDN Controller
takes the appropriate prevention actions against
node B.
ii. To drop the received packet from node A:
If node B reports that A is an adversary
({e||s′A||sB}) and drops the received packet from
node A, then the SDN Controller, despite the
invalid tag s
′
A, will not consider node A as an
adversary until it receives more reports against
node A. However, more reports against node
A will not be received by the SDN Controller
because node A is a normal node.
• Scenario-2 Two or more adversaries in a row: In this
scenario, node A and node B are considered as adversary
nodes. As shown in Fig. 11, node B, as an adversary,
cannot send a valid expanded coded packet {bi||tSN ||si}
to Hotspot because it will receive a polluted packet from
the previous node, A, which is an adversary and does
not have access to the valid tag (tSN ) to get verified
successfully by the SDN Controller. Therefore, the SDN
Controller detects and blocks the adversary node, B,
from the network. After blocking node B from the net-
work, the network has now one adversary node (i.e.,
FIGURE 12. An Internal pollution attack; node B has been detected as an
adversary by Hotspot and blocked from the network.
node A) between two normal nodes (see Fig. 12), which
is similar to the first scenario. Moreover, it is worthwhile
to mention that Scenario 2 is valid for more than two
adversaries in a row when the adversaries cannot verify
themselves to the SDN Controller. In this case, they will
be blocked from accessing the network.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, the implementation process is discussed
regarding the proposed IDLP mechanism and is compared
with our previous IDPS scheme [1], which was the first time
that a novel intrusion detection and prevention scheme for
NC-enabled mobile small cells was proposed. First of all,
we implemented three butterfly topologies, including 18 nor-
mal nodes and 1 adversary node (see Fig. 13), and applied the
RLNC approach to it. In addition, we programmed the adver-
sary node to modify its received packets so as to demonstrate
a pollution attack.
The implementation is based on the recoding library of
Kodo which allows encoding at the source node, recoding
at the intermediate nodes, and decoding at the destination
nodes [39]. This is the most famous network coding library
that academic community uses in order to implement network
coding algorithms on Kodo which is an open-source library
based on C++, but allows the use of the library functionality
with different programming languages, like C, C++, Python,
etc. [39]–[43]. Various network coding algorithms such as
Systematic RLNC, Sparse RLNC, and Standard RLNC, are
supported by Kodo [40], [44]. However, Kodo has some
limitations regarding the creation of a customized generation
of packets and keys and also regarding tag generation. There-
fore, in our implementation, the packets, their proper tags, and
the required keys at the source node and intermediate nodes
were generated byMatlab. Then, the generated packets, keys,
and tags were included manually in Kodo so as to achieve the
desired functionality of the implemented scenario on Kodo.
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FIGURE 13. Implemented three butterfly topologies.
FIGURE 14. The Ttotal for different number of tags in [1] and the
proposed IDLP mechanism.
The packet generation size is selected to be 64 symbols
and the symbol size is set between 1, 000 to 10, 000 bytes,
as shown in Fig. 14 to Fig. 17. In addition, the number of tags
appended to the end of each packet is L, which can be 27,
42, or 54 [30], and the Galois field in use is GF28. Finally,
it is worthwhile to mention that the machine used for running
the whole implementation has the following characteristics:
a 2.7 GHz Core i7 CPU with 8GB of physical memory.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, the performance evaluation of the proposed
IDLP mechanism, in terms of computational and communi-
cation overheads, as well as the successfully decoding prob-
ability are provided and compared with the IDPS scheme
proposed in [1]. It should be noted that the proposed IDLP
mechanism does not only detect the pollution attacks, but
also detects the exact location of the attacker(s) and decides
about the preventive actions (e.g., block compromised mobile
device from accessing the network) that should be taken
FIGURE 15. The Tver for different number of tags in [1] and the proposed
IDLP mechanism.
to stop the attack and protects the resources of the net-
work. While the IDPS scheme proposed in [1] only detects
and drops the polluted packets, which, however, allows
attackers to continue making pollution attacks that lead to
waste of network resources. Also, the implementation of
the previous IDPS scheme showed that it does not bring
high overhead computational complexity. On the other hand,
the proposed IDLP mechanism has better performance not
only in the decoding probability but also in computational
and communication overheads. In particular, the proposed
IDLP mechanism has less unsuccessful decoding probability
because when the attacker’s location is detected, the attacker
is blocked by the SDN Controller, and the attacker cannot
continue polluting. Thus, the probability that the attackers
can overpass the proposed IDLP mechanism is close to zero.
The comparisons are described in the following sections.
Regarding the implementation, it is noteworthy to highlight
that the proposed IDLP mechanism was implemented on
Kodo over 3 butterfly topologies, as shown in Fig. 13, similar
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to the implementation of the IDPS scheme proposed in [1],
and this allows us to compare their performance evaluation
results in terms of computational complexity, computational
overhead, and unsuccessful decoding probability.
A. COMPUTATIONAL OVERHEAD
As it was mentioned before, based on [30], the number of the
tags appended to the end of each coded packet is assumed to
be L, where L can be 27, 42, or 54, and the Galois field in use
is GF(28). Also, the selected generation size is 64 symbols,
and the symbol size is set between 1, 000 bytes and 10, 000
bytes.
It should be mentioned that the total time elapsed from
when the packet is generated to when the packet is verified
and decoded at the destination nodes is given by the following
Equation:
Ttotal = Tenc + Trec + Tdec + Tver (12)
In this Equation, Tenc is the time for encoding at the source
node, Trec is the time for recoding at each intermediate node,
Tdec is the time for decoding at the destination node, and Tver
is the time for verifying at the intermediate and destination
nodes.
The Ttotal , for the IDPS scheme presented in [1] and the
proposed IDLP mechanism are illustrated in Fig. 14. This
figure include three curves based on the number of tags (i.e.,
L = 27, 42, 54) for each approach. As shown, by increasing
the number of tags, the Ttotal increases as well. However,
the Ttotal for a different number of tags in the proposed IDLP
mechanism (e.g., Ttotal,L=54 = 0.20 when the packet length
is 10, 000 bytes) is less than the Ttotal in the IDPS scheme
(e.g., Ttotal,L=54 = 0.22 when the packet length is 10, 000
bytes) presented in [1].
It is worthwhile to mention that the reason why the Ttotal
in the proposed IDLP mechanism decreases compared to the
Ttotal in IDPS scheme presented in [1], despite the fact that the
IDLP mechanism provides not only detection but also locat-
ing functionality, is that in the IDLPmechanism the detection
scheme does not need to apply to all the intermediate nodes,
unlike the IDPS scheme presented in [1].
Additionally, the time required to verify and detect any
corrupted packet in the network for both the previous IDPS
scheme and the proposed IDLP mechanism is presented
in Fig. 15, respectively. As shown in this figure, the required
time for verification in the proposed IDLP mechanism is less
than the IDPS scheme presented in [1]. However, it should be
pointed out that the IDLP mechanism, during the verification
and detection time, does not only detect and drop the polluted
packet but also detects the exact location of the attacker(s) and
block them from the network.
B. COMMUNICATIONAL OVERHEAD
To determine the communication overhead of the proposed
IDLP mechanism, the communication time Tcomm is defined
as follows:
Tcomm = Ttotal − Tver (13)
FIGURE 16. The Tcomm for different number of tags in [1] and the
proposed IDLP mechanism.
FIGURE 17. The Pr for different number of tags in [1] and the proposed
IDLP mechanism.
Fig. 16 shows the Tcomm based on the different numbers
of tags used in the IDPS scheme presented in [1] and the
proposed IDLP mechanism, respectively. The results show
that the Tcomm for the proposed IDLP is less than the Tcomm
for the IDPS in [1]. The difference is due to the fact that the
proposed IDLP mechanism blocks the adversaries and thus,
they are not able anymore to modify the packets in transit.
Therefore, the SN does not need to resend packets.
C. DECODING PROBABILITY
The Pr is defined as the probability that a corrupted packet
is not detected in the verification phase. Fig. 17 shows the
Pr for the proposed IDLP mechanism and the IDPS scheme
presented in [1] based on three different number of tags
(L = 27, 42, and 54). As shown in this figure, thePr is almost
0 for the proposed IDLP mechanism. However, the IDPS
proposed in [1] is near to 0. In other words, in the IDPS
scheme, the adversary does not have any chance to distribute
the corrupted packet in the network. However, they can make
pollution in the next transmission for coded packet from SN
to DNs in the network. Nevertheless, in the proposed IDLP
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mechanism, the detected adversaries are blocked from access
to the network in the future.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper proposed an efficient IDLP mechanism for Net-
work Coding-enabled Mobile Small Cells. The proposed
IDLP mechanism is an extension of our previously proposed
location-aware IDPS scheme for network coding-enabled
mobile small cells presented in [27] and consists of detection
schemes and locating scheme. We use the null space-based
homomorphic MAC scheme [14] for both the detection and
locating schemes, which is adapted to the mobile small cell
environment. The proposed IDLP mechanism does not only
detect the pollution attacks, but also detects the exact location
of the attacker(s) and decides about the preventive actions
(e.g., block compromised mobile device from accessing the
network) that should be taken to stop the attack and protect
the resources of the network. It is worthwhile to mention
that the proposed IDLP mechanism is more efficient than
the previous IDPS scheme proposed in [1], which is the first
proposed IDPS for NC-enabled mobile small cells, because
it is not needed to be applied to all mobile devices in order
to protect the NC-enabled mobile small cells from the deple-
tion of their resources. Both the IDLP mechanism and the
IDPS scheme proposed in [1] have been implemented in
Kodo and their performance has been evaluated in terms of
computational complexity, communicational overhead, and
successfully decoding probability as well. The performance
evaluation results verified that the proposed IDLPmechanism
ismore efficient than the IDPS scheme proposed in [1] since it
demonstrates reduced computational complexity, communi-
cational overhead, and unsuccessfully decoding probability.
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